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THE CANONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
TEACHING WITH A POLITICALHISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
Louis Fisher*
In my writings on constitutional law, I make an effort to
provide a broad context so that readers and students can better
appreciate and understand a court decision. I want them to understand the conditions that give rise to a court case and how
those conditions influence what a court eventually does, either to
duck a case or decide it. I want them to understand the role of
other institutions, particularly Congress, the President, and the
executive agencies.
I also devote considerable space to showing how the same
constitutional issue is treated differently at the state level. By
rejecting the "Supreme Court Only" model, I complicate the
story of constitutional law somewhat, but this approach produces
an account that is not only more accurate but more interesting.
No one branch of government prevails. The process is polyarchal, not hierarchical. The latter, perhaps attractive for architectural structures, is inconsistent with our aspiration for selfgovernment.
The task of understanding these dimensions has been made
easier by my association and friendship with Neal Devins.
Starting first with lunches, followed by jointly-written articles,
moving on to Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law (now in
its third edition), and with the completion of a book-length
treatment of constitutional law in a democratic society, I have
learned much about the ins and outs, the trends and patterns, of
our legal process. Typically, after Neal and I battle out an issue,
I am forced to return to my constitutional law text to rewrite sections and get it a little better.

* Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, The
Library of Congress.
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I. A RICH DIALOGUE

In my textbook, American Constitutional Law,1 I do whatever I can, at every opportunity, to highlight the dialogue that
exists among the judiciary, Congress, the President, the states,
and the general public. The opening chapter sets the stage for
these participants, including j.ssues of judicial capacity for making social policy and the role of public opinion, lobbyists, and
group pressures in identifying and defining constitutional values.
Readings and boxed materials highlight Jefferson's position on
the Sedition Act, Jackson's veto of the Bank Bill, and Lincoln's
critique of Dred Scott. In Chapter 2, on judicial review, I provide many materials to keep Marbury v. Madison in its proper,
limited place: statements by Madison, Justices Chase and Iredell,
and John Marshall's letter to Chase, arguing that Congress, instead of impeaching judges for their decisions, should simply reverse legal opinions "deemed unsound by the legislature," for
that would "better comport with the mildness of our character."
Other materials in these early chapters, including one on thresholds, identify the many factors that limit judicial power.
Throughout the rest of the book, I offer dozens of examples
of this judicial-nonjudicial dialogue. Some constitutional issues
never reach the courts, like the Ineligibility Clause (pp. 183-85).
Two back-to-back readings explain how the Court strikes down
the legislative veto but Congress-operating through committee
and subcommittee vetoes-continues it (pp. 243-50); two readings show how the Court decides some high-profile disputes over
executive privilege (the Watergate case) but other courts encourage congressional committees and the executive branch to
settle their disputes outside the courts (the AT&T cases) (pp.
262-68); two readings illustrate how the Court can read presidential power broadly in Curtiss-Wright but Congress, in the IranContra report, finds Curtiss-Wright deficient in reasoning (pp.
288-92); a box on page 347 explains how much Chief Justice
Marshall in McCulloch borrowed from executive branch interpretations on the constitutionality of the U.S. Bank; one reading
has the Court in Pennsylvania v. Nelson (1956) offering views
about preemption, while the next has Congress lambasting the
Court's ruling, followed by the Court backing away in Uphaus v.
Wyman (pp. 423-26).

1. Louis Fisher, American Constitutional Law (Carolina Academic Press, 3d ed.
1999}. The fourth edition will be published in February, 2001.
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So it goes. Although at times I have Congress championing
and protecting rights left unsecured by the courts, I include
readings to show how Congress has failed in its constitutional
duties, as with the appropriations rider that led to United States
v. Lovett (1946) (pp. 514-16). I also include congressional debate
on the Sedition Act of 1798 (pp. 569-71 ).
On religious freedom, I include President Clinton's 1995
memo on legitimate ways of providing for religious expression in
public schools (p. 697), and follow that with a reading from congressional hearings in 1964 that helped build better support and
understanding of the Court's decision in Engel v. Vitale, helping
to forestall a constitutional amendment (pp. 701-02). When the
Supreme Court in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily (1978) opened
third-parties (including the press) to search and seizure, Congress responded with legislation two years later to place restrictions on such practices. I give the background on this and include the congressional debate (pp. 789-91).
The difficult area of electronic surveillance depends to a
great extent on executive branch initiatives and legislation
adopted by Congress (pp. 823-27). After the Supreme Court in
United States v. Miller (1976) held that bank depositors were not
protected by the Fourth Amendment when the government
wanted to gain access to microfilms of checks, deposit slips, or
other bank records, Congress passed the Financial Privacy Act
of 1978 to offer greater rights and protections to depositors. I
include a reading on the congressional debate (pp. 1097-98).
In Mobile v. Bolden (1980), the Supreme Court held that
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 only prohibits states from purposefully discriminating against the voting rights of blacks. I include a reading for that decision, but follow it with the congressional debate in 1982 on legislation to allow plaintiffs to show
discrimination not on intent but solely on the effects of a voting
plan (pp. 1122-28).
II. INDEPENDENT STATE ACTION
Just as I emphasize the participation of all three branches at
the national level, so do I show the actions of the fifty states and
how they reach constitutional decisions that depart from and
reject the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court. One of my favorite
examples is the decision of the Supreme Court of Washington in
1980 to exclude evidence from a trial, the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court two years later to reverse and remand the state
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court decision to allow the introduction of the evidence under
the "plain view" doctrine, and the decision by the state supreme
court in 1984 to resolve the issue solely under the state constitution and state laws, leading to the exclusion of the evidence and
the rejection of what the U.S. Supreme Court had decided (p.
22).
On free speech in shopping centers, I have a box that lists
the state courts that have decided to protect free speech more
broadly than the U.S. Supreme Court does (p. 540). Although
the U.S. Supreme Court has supported the use of public funds to
pay for textbooks and transportation for parochial schools, I
have a chart on page 680 that shows the many states that reject
such assistance by analyzing specific language in state constitutions. These courts reflected on the "child benefit" theory offered by the U.S. Supreme Court and found it wanting and unpersuasive. I have a box on page 727 describing how state courts
have rejected the Supreme Court's decision in Swain v. Alabama
(1965), regarding peremptory challenges of jurors.
The Supreme Court received great credit for its decision in
Gideon v. Wainwright (1962), but state courts had recognized the
need to provide counsel for indigents a century earlier (p. 750).
On the issue of conducting search and seizure of trash and garbage, some state courts have declined to accept such practices, as
the Supreme Court did in California v. Greenwood (1988) (box
on p. 796). Similarly, some state courts have parted company
with the Court's decision in United States v. Ross (1982) regarding warrantless searches of automobiles (box on p. 798). In 1992,
the Supreme Court of Hawaii chose to adopt a principle of
search and seizure more protective of individual rights than
could be obtained from the U.S. Supreme Court (box on p. 801).
A number of states have rejected the Supreme Court's decision
regarding the Leon good-faith test (box on p. 838).
In a box on page 921, I summarize the recent initiatives in
such states as California, Texas, and Michigan to place limits on
affirmative action policies. A box on page 1048 shows how a
number of state courts have decided that restrictions on public
funding of abortion, such as the Hyde Amendment at the federal
level (upheld by the Supreme Court), are unacceptable under
state constitutions. I include a reading on the House debate on
the Hyde Amendment (pp. 1059-61).
Although the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)
upheld a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy, a number of
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states have invalidated state statutes that criminalize consensual
sodomy. I discuss those and include a box on the 1992 Kentucky
decision, Commonwealth v. Sasson (pp.1087-88).
III. OPERATING IN ALL THE BRANCHES
Law students need this broader picture in order to function
effectively after they graduate. Much of their time will be spent
in litigating, or assisting in litigating, but when results in the
courts are disappointing they need to know how to turn to other
political institutions to seek satisfaction for their clients.
A typical example is Nathan Lewin, who handled the yarmulke case for Captain Simcha Goldman. Lewin first tried to
convince the Air Force to change its regulation to permit Captain Goldman, an Orthodox Jew, to wear his yarmulke while indoors on duty. When that failed, Lewin took the dispute to
court, narrowly losing when it reached the Supreme Court in
Goldman v. Weinberger (1986). Defeat was not the end of the
road. Lewin next turned to Congress, which every year passes a
military authorization bill. In 1987 he was able to get an
amendment enacted that told the Air Force to change its regulation, allowing people in the military to wear religious apparel so
long as it does not interfere with their military duties.
In setting this up in my textbook, I devote a paragraph to
the basic ingredients of the dispute, including Justice Brennan's
dissent that urged Congress to safeguard religious freedoms left
unprotected by the Court (p. 642). Next I have excerpts from
the Court's decision (pp. 648-50). I immediately follow that with
the House and Senate debates on the legislation that would require the Air Force to change the regulation (pp. 650-53). The
debate is not only instructive but amusing, particularly the futile
"20-star letter" from the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposing the
amendment (four stars for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
joined by four stars each for the General of the Air Force, the
General of the Army, the General of the Marine Corps, and the
Admiral ofthe Navy!).
IV. PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS
The yarmulke case is a good way to test the proposition that
the judiciary is somehow better structured than legislative bodies
to protect minorities. From James Madison to the present, it is
widely argued that courts stand as sturdy sentinels to shield indi-
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viduals and minorities from unbridled majoritarian actions.
Madison believed that by adding the Bill of Rights to the Constitution, "independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves
in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights." 2 It didn't
turn out that way. For the first century and a half, individual
rights were decided almost exclusively by the majoritarian process. On the rare occasions when such issues were brought before
the federal courts, judges were more likely to side with government and corporations than with individuals.3
While the record of federal courts in the past half century
has improved, contemporary scholars continue to exaggerate the
extent to which courts can be trusted to protect individual and
minority rights. Insulated somewhat from political forces, federal judges are said to have the independence and technical expertise to defend constitutional rights, especially those of minorities.4 The political branches and the general public-operating
through legislatures that vote on majoritarian grounds-are supposedly less sensitive to personal rights and liberties. 5 It is said
that political power must be invested in an unelected Court to
protect minorities "from democratic excess. "6 In his famous
footnote in Carolene Products, Justice Stone said that a "more
searching judicial inquiry" may be required to protect "discrete
and insular minorities. "7
The Supreme Court's actual record in safeguarding minority
and individual rights has never been that attractive or reliable.
The Court barely began to sketch out a jurisprudence of relig-

2. 1 Annals of Cong. 457 (1789).
3. See generally Henry W. Edgerton, The Incidence of Judicial Control Over Congress, 22 Corn. L.Q. 299 (1937).
4. See Laurence H. Tribe, God Save This Honorable Court 20 (Random House,
1985) ("Even when the Congress and the President can be counted upon to defend most
of us from the infringement of fundamental liberties, because the political majorities to
which those departments of government answer demand such protection, the Supreme
Court often stands alone as the guardian of minority groups. The democratic political
process, by its very nature, leaves political minorities vulnerable to the will of the majority. True, the Supreme Court's record in championing the cause of oppressed minorities
is hardly unstained.").
5. See Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 2 (U.
Chicago Press, 1980) (" ... although judicial review is incompatible with a fundamental
precept of American democracy-majority rule-the Court must exercise this power in
order to protect individual rights, which are not adequately represented in the political
processes").
6. William Mishler and Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution?: The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 87,87 (1993).
7. United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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ious freedom until1940.8 Individuals and private organizations,
in their efforts to protect their rights, often turn to nonjudicial
bodies and the states for relief. Instead of the Court serving as
the exclusive or even dominant guardian of individual rights, a
powerful dialogue operates between judicial and nonjudicial
bodies, with the courts often playing a secondary role. Caught in
this crossfire, the Court can be overridden by a majoritarian process that advances liberties beyond what is available from the
courts.
There should be nothing astonishing about the proposition
that the Court has a limited role to play in protecting individual
liberties. Congress, the President, and state governments have
major institutional strengths and responsibilities and are frequently driven by private groups that are well-organized and effective in articulating and advancing their values, preferences,
and agendas. Despite the belief that majoritarian institutions
cannot protect minority rights, Congress and the President often
champion the cause of individuals who are rebuffed by the
courts. As one study noted: "the Court has not been behaving as
the counter-majoritarian force of its textbook description. It has
instead been heeding quite carefully the policies endorsed by the
majoritarian branches of government. "9
I have readings from the flag-salute cases of 1940 and 1943,
but my text makes it clear that the more generous reading of religious freedom comes from the broad public condemnation of
the 1940 decision, not from any fine sentiments on the Court
(pp. 639-40). Smith, RFRA, Boerne, and "Son of RFRA" give
me an opportunity to again discuss the vigorous dialogue on religious freedom between the Court and nonjudicial institutions
(pp. 657-58, 659, 667-78).
Although constitutional law texts often concentrate on
Brown v. Board of Education and subsequent cases to suggest a
Court solicitous of civil rights, I devote many pages to the preBrown record: the record leading up to and including Dred Scott
(pp. 855-62); the progressive legislation adopted by Congress after the Civil War, some of which (particularly public accommodations) was struck down by the Court (pp. 862-64, 866-69); the
need for federal legislation to convert the principles of Brown
into reality (pp. 875-78, 882-88, 907-08); and the combination of
8. See generally Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
9. Leslie Friedman Goldstein, The ERA and the U.S. Supreme Court, 1 Res. in L.
& Pol'y Stud. 145, 154-55 (1987).
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judicial rulings, executive orders, and congressional statutes regarding affirmative action (pp. 914-22).
Similarly, the record of state and federal courts in protecting
women's rights ranged from "poor to abominable" (Johnson &
Knapp study in 1971). In sharp contrast, state legislatures and
Congress as early as the 1870s began to enact many measures to
support the rights of women to engage in various professions, including law. This is impressive. All-male legislatures were voting in favor of women's rights. I devote substantial text and several boxes and readings to drive home this point (pp. 945-57). A
main purpose of the ERA, as Congressman Martha Griffiths
said, was to tell the Supreme Court: "Wake up! This is the 20th
century. Before it is over, judge women as individual human
beings. "10 Much of what has happened since that time in protecting the rights of women consist of statutory initiatives (pp.
957-65), in some cases to reverse such Court decisions as General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert (1976). I have a reading on the Senate's
debate on women used in combat roles (pp. 985-86).
V. COURT-CURBING EFFORTS
As the final chapter of the cloth edition, and as the final
chapter of both of the paperback splits, I conclude with a wrapup chapter "Efforts to Curb the Court." I open by rejecting Justice Stone's advice to his brethren: "the only check upon our
own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint." Judges
operate within an environment that constantly tests the reasonableness and acceptability of their rulings.
Earlier chapters identified some of the constraints that operate on the judiciary: the President's power to appoint, the Senate's power to confirm, congressional powers over the purse, impeachment, legislative controls over court jurisdiction, and the
force of public opinion, the press, and scholarly studies. The final chapters cover constitutional amendments, statutory reversals, changing the number of Justices (court packing), withdrawing jurisdiction, and noncompliance with court rulings.
I discuss, in the text and in a box, the statute that Congress
passed in 1867 in response to Ex parte Milligan (pp. 1203-_04). In
the section "Constitutional Dialogues," I analyze the vanous arguments for judicial finality, include a box on Chief Justice Warren's challenge to the idea of judicial supremacy, discuss the flap
10.

117 Cong. Rec. 35323 (1971).
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over Ed Meese's speech "The Law of the Constitution" in 1986,
and add an interesting give-and-take between Senator Specter
and Judge Anthony Kennedy at Kennedy's 1987 confirmation
hearing (pp. 1218-23). I set forth eight guidelines to qualify the
last-word doctrine (pp. 1217-18). I conclude that judicial supremacy is incompatible with the value we place on freedom,
discourse, and limited government, and that the dialogue between the Court and the rest of society is both constructive and
stabilizing because it adds to public understanding and public
support for constitutional values.
VI. EDITING CASES
Part of the headache (or challenge) in editing court cases is
boiling them down. Certainly the reasoning process of the Court
is important to include, but is that just the central reasoning or
the side trips as well? I try to make room for both so the students do not think judges reason in straight-line fashion. I also
do what I can to include not merely dissents but significant concurrences, especially when a "concurrence" looks a little more
like a dissent or finds serious deficiencies with the majority or
plurality opinion.
Second, it is tempting to keep cutting existing case readings
to make room for new ones, but I don't want to see cases like
Marbury, McCulloch, Dred Scott, etc., chopped down to a few
paragraphs. In my book, with oversized pages and two columns
per page for readings, Marbury takes more than five pages, and I
follow that with about three pages from Van Alstyne's "A Critical Guide." McCulloch runs more than five pages and Dred
Scott is about five. The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 and Plessy v.
Ferguson are about four pages each. A number of constitutional
law texts give short shrift to these early civil rights cases, but I
want to remind the reader of what the Court did in earlier days.
VII. COURT DOCTRINES
To simplify the student's task somewhat, I box up and
summarize various Court doctrines: standing for Members of
Congress (p. 14), the elements of standing (p. 90), the mootness
doctrine (p. 106), the ripeness doctrine (p. 110), criteria for political questions (p. 114), major reasons for granting certiorari (p.
158), delegation doctrines (p. 224), judicial standards for congressional investigations (p. 253), what the Speech or Debate
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Clause does and does not cover (p. 274), stages of federalism (p.
379), the doctrine of vested rights (p. 441), free speech tests (p.
497), forums for speech (p. 517), judicial guidelines for free
speech cases (p. 522), acceptable and unacceptable regulations
for the press (p. 573), libel doctrines (p. 596), obscenity doctrines
(p. 613), protected and unprotected areas of religious liberty (p.
638), the Lemon test (p. 653), acceptable and unacceptable financial assistance to sectarian schools (p. 685), the complex area
of double jeopardy rulings (p. 738), compelled testimony and
tainted witnesses (p. 747), required and unrequired assistance of
counsel (p. 751), habeas corpus relief for death-row inmates (p.
773), standards for administrative inspections (p. 803), exceptions to the exclusionary rule (p. 836), stages in the racial integration of public facilities (p. 900), affirmative action principles
(p. 919), standards of review (p. 958), permissible and impermissible regulations for abortion (p. 1053), deviations from mathemathical exactness for reapportionment (p. 1132), controls on
independent campaign expenditures (p. 1172), and permissible
and impermissible limits on campaign funding (p. 1173).

